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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution:
The Rational Pursuit of Wisdom
Nicholas Maxwell
Introduction
We are in a state of impending crisis. And the fault lies in
part with academia. For two centuries or so, academia has
been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and technological
know-how. This has enormously increased our power to act
which has, in turn, brought us both all the great benefits of
the modern world and the crises we now face. Modern
science and technology have made possible modern industry
and agriculture, the explosive growth of the world’s
population, global warming, modern armaments and the
lethal character of modern warfare, destruction of natural
habitats and rapid extinction of species, immense inequalities
of wealth and power across the globe, pollution of earth, sea
and air, even the AIDS epidemic (AIDS being spread by
modern travel). All these global problems, involving
preventable deaths of millions, have arisen because some of
us have acquired unprecedented powers to act without
acquiring the capacity to act wisely. We urgently need to
bring about a revolution in universities so that the basic
intellectual aim becomes, not knowledge merely, but rather
to help humanity acquire the capacity to resolve conflicts and
problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways. The
revolution we need would affect every branch and aspect of
academic inquiry. The basic intellectual task of academia
would be to articulate our problems of living (personal,
social and global) and propose and critically assess possible
solutions, possible actions. This would be the task of social
inquiry and the humanities. Tackling problems of knowledge
would be secondary. Social inquiry would be at the heart of2
the academic enterprise, intellectually more fundamental
than natural science. On a rather more long-term basis, social
inquiry would be concerned to help humanity build
cooperatively rational methods of problem-solving into the
fabric of social and political life, so that we may gradually
acquire the capacity to resolve our conflicts and problems of
living in more cooperatively rational ways. Natural science
would change to include three domains of discussion:
evidence, theory, and aims – the latter including discussion
of metaphysics, values and politics. Academia would
actively seek to educate the public by means of discussion
and debate. These changes all come from demanding that
academia cure its current damaging structural irrationality,
so that reason – the authentic article – may be devoted to
promoting human welfare.
That, in outline, is my thesis and argument. In order to
develop my case in a little more detail, let me begin with a
slightly more detailed discussion of our current global
problems.
Our Grave Global Problems
There is, to begin with, the problem of the sustained and
profound injustice of immense differences of wealth across
the globe, the industrially advanced first world of North
America, Europe and elsewhere experiencing unprecedented
wealth while something like a third of all people alive today,
in Africa, south America, Asia and elsewhere, live in
conditions of poverty in the developing world, hungry,
unemployed, without proper housing, health care, education,
or even access to safe water. UNICEF estimates that over 9
million children die every year from preventable causes –
some 25,000 every day. There is the problem of the lethal
character of modern warfare. Whereas something like 12
million people were killed in wars in the 19
th century, over
100 million died in wars in the 20
th century – and we have
not done very well in the 21
st century so far. There is the3
arms trade, the massive stockpiling of armaments, even by
poor countries, and the ever-present threat of their use by
terrorists or in war, whether the arms be conventional,
chemical, biological or nuclear. And not only is there the
threat of terrorism: even more serious, perhaps, there are the
dire consequences of our appalling responses to terrorism.
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There is the problem of the progressive destruction of
tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, with its
concomitant devastating extinction of species. There is the
long-standing problem of the rapid growth of the world's
population, especially pronounced in the poorest parts of the
world, and adversely affecting efforts at development. If
current trends continue there will be over nine and a half
billion people in the world by the middle of the century.
There is the horror of the AIDS epidemic, again far more
terrible in the poorest parts of the world, devastating millions
of lives, destroying families, and crippling economies.
And over all this hangs the menace of global warming.
We have known about global warming for a very long time.
John Tyndall discovered that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse
gas as long ago as 1859, and Svante Arrhenius realised in
1896 that we would cause global warming. The first person
really to discover that we are causing global warming was
Guy Callendar, who gave a lecture to the Meteorological
Society in London on the subject in 1938. He was not
believed – and of course, 1938 was not the best time to make
the announcement! Any lingering doubts should have been
removed, however when, in the late 1950s, Charles Keeling,
in Hawaii, began to make extremely accurate measurements
of the increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
2 Nearly
half a century later, we are just beginning to realise how
serious the problem is. We have hardly begun to do
anything about it. Some experts think it is already too late.
If we carry on as we are, vast tracts of the earth’s surface
will become uninhabitable. Even if we cut back dramatically
on our CO2 emissions globally overnight, global warming4
will still occur. And there are dreadful dangers. Ice at the
poles and in glaciers is melting at an alarming rate. As the
polar ice melts, less sunlight is reflected back into space,
which further contributes to global warming. And there are a
number of other such ‘tipping points’. Vast quantities of
methane are trapped in permanently frozen ground in Canada
and Russia, and under the sea. If global warming melts this
ground, and the methane is released from the earth and sea,
as is already happening to some extent, this will further
accelerate warming, as methane is a very much stronger
greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide. Global warming might
turn tropical rain forests, already under threat, into deserts:
the destruction of trees and other vegetation that this would
involve would further contribute to carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, and to global warming. Even if we avoid the
worst, nevertheless millions of people may die as a result of
drought, hurricanes, floods, and rising tides.
The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution.
What can we do to tackle these immense global problems
more effectively and humanely than we are doing at present?
There are endlessly many different things that need to be
done, some of which are being done. But I want to
concentrate on just one crucial institution, rarely mentioned
in the present context, which nevertheless has a crucial role
to play – namely academia.
Academia – universities and schools – ought to be playing
a vital role in helping us discover what we need to do to
tackle our global problems, and how we can motivate
ourselves to do what we need to do. Sustained exploration
of what our global problems are, and what we need to do in
order to help resolve them, ought to be at the heart of the
academic enterprise. But this is not the case. Instead,
academia has, by and large, concentrated on the pursuit of
knowledge and technological know-how. And in some
respects this has just made matters worse. Modern science5
and technological know-how have made possible all our
current global problems, so characteristic of our age. Indeed,
in a perfectly respectable sense of “cause”, science and
technology have caused our global problems (Maxwell,
2000).
Natural science has been extraordinarily successful in
improving knowledge. This has had all sorts immensely
beneficial results, for medicine, agriculture, industry,
transport, communications, etc., etc. – as well as having the
intrinsic value of enormously enhancing our knowledge and
understanding of the universe around us. The modern world
is inconceivable without modern science. But knowledge
and technological know-how increase our capacity to act
which, in addition to having beneficial consequences, can
also have harmful ones, whether intended, as in war or
terrorism, or unintended as – at least initially – in the case of
environmental degradation. Scientific knowledge and
technological know-how make modern industry, agriculture,
medicine and hygiene possible, which in turn lead to
population growth, destruction of natural habitats and
extinction of species, pollution of the earth, sea and air,
global warming, and even the AIDS crisis – AIDS being
spread by modern travel. And modern technology has
massively increased the lethal character of modern war, and
terrorism. Martin Rees, the current President of the Royal
Society, thinks the dangers are so great this may even be
“our final century” – the title of a book of his (Rees, 2003).
What has gone wrong? Some blame science for our
troubles – but that rather misses the point. As I shall argue
in a moment, we need to learn from the immense success of
science, rather than just blame it for our troubles. What has
gone wrong is that academic inquiry as a whole has
concentrated on acquiring knowledge dissociated from a
more fundamental concern with helping us learn how to
tackle our problems of living in cooperatively rational ways.6
Instead of giving priority to problems of living, academia has
concentrated on solving problems of knowledge and this,
entirely predictably, has resulted in our current global
problems. Judged from the really quite orthodox standpoint
of helping to promote human welfare, academic inquiry
devoted to acquiring knowledge is grossly and damagingly
irrational – and this is, in the long term, the source of our
troubles. The crisis of our times – the crisis behind all the
others – is science without wisdom. Far from trying to
ameliorate this crisis, modern science and academia in
important respects have the effect of intensifying it.
Here, then, in outline, is the nub of my thesis and
argument. We need to distinguish two conceptions and
kinds of inquiry which I shall call knowledge-inquiry and
wisdom-inquiry. Knowledge-inquiry is, by and large, what
we have at present. It is, however, damagingly and
profoundly irrational, in a wholesale, structural way.
Wisdom-inquiry results when knowledge-inquiry is modified
just sufficiently to become a kind of inquiry rationally
devoted to helping promote human welfare by intellectual
and educational means. Two arguments establish that
knowledge-inquiry is irrational, one that appeals to problem-
solving rationality, and a second that appeals to aim-oriented
rationality. The outcome of these arguments is that we
urgently need to bring about a revolution in academia so that
the basic task becomes to help humanity learn how to create
a better world.
The argument, as just stated, simplifies matters somewhat,
as I shall indicate as we proceed. Academia today does not,
in every respect, conform to the edicts of knowledge-inquiry.
Many universities are probably, in academic practice, an
admixture of the two conceptions of inquiry. Furthermore,
as I shall indicate, there are hints that, in recent years, the
influence of wisdom-inquiry is on the increase. The
revolution may already be underway! Nevertheless, at the7
time of writing, knowledge-inquiry is still the dominant view
in academic practice.
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Knowledge-Inquiry: Exposition
Knowledge-inquiry demands that a sharp split be made
between the social or humanitarian aims of inquiry and the
intellectual aim. The intellectual aim is to acquire
knowledge of truth, nothing being presupposed about the
truth. Only those considerations may enter into the
intellectual domain of inquiry relevant to the determination
of truth – claims to knowledge, results of observation and
experiment, arguments designed to establish truth or falsity.
Feelings and desires, values, ideals, political and religious
views, expressions of hopes and fears, cries of pain,
articulation of problems of living: all these must be
ruthlessly excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry
as having no relevance to the pursuit of knowledge –
although of course inquiry can seek to develop factual
knowledge about these things, within psychology, sociology
or anthropology. Within natural science, an even more
severe censorship system operates: an idea, in order to enter
into the intellectual domain of science, must be an
empirically testable claim to factual knowledge.
The basic idea of knowledge-inquiry, then, is this. First,
knowledge is to be acquired; then it can be applied to help
solve social problems. For this to work, authentic objective
knowledge must be acquired. Almost paradoxically, human
values and aspirations must be excluded from the intellectual
domain of inquiry so that genuine factual knowledge is
acquired and inquiry can be of genuine human value, and can
be capable of helping us realise our human aspirations.
At the core of knowledge-inquiry there is a conception of
science which may be called standard empiricism: the basic
intellectual aim of science is truth, and the basic method is to
assess claims to knowledge with respect to evidence, nothing8
being assumed permanently about the universe independent
of evidence.
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Knowledge-inquiry exercises a profound influence over
the whole character and structure of academia – in
influencing such things as what is to count as a contribution
to thought, criteria for publication, factors influencing
promotions, prizes and academic status, content of thought
and education.
5 Not everything in academia conforms to
knowledge-inquiry. It is qualified by the influence of the
Romantic movement, by what Isaiah Berlin (1980, pp. 1-24)
called the counter-Enlightenment, and by recent fads such as
postmodernism, relativism and social constructivism, all of
which, in various ways, cast doubt on the feasibility or value
of science, knowledge and rationality.
6 And, as I have
mentioned, a few recent, scattered hints of movement toward
wisdom-inquiry can perhaps be discerned. Knowledge-
inquiry is, however, the only widely understood current ideal
of rational inquiry, and its influence, by and large, still
prevails.
It is vital to appreciate that the problem with knowledge-
inquiry is not that it gives too much emphasis to rationality
but, quite the contrary, that it is a characteristic form of
irrationality masquerading as rationality. Knowledge-
inquiry violates three of the four most elementary rules of
reason one can think of.
From Knowledge-Inquiry to Wisdom-Inquiry:
First Argument
I now spell out my first argument in support of my
contention that knowledge-inquiry, despite being the
predominant influence over academia today, is nevertheless
profoundly and damagingly irrational in a wholesale,
structural way, there being, for both intellectual and
humanitarian reasons, an urgent need to put wisdom-inquiry
into academic practice instead.9
But first, what do I mean by “rationality”? As I use the
term, rationality appeals to the idea that there is some no
doubt rather ill-defined set of rules, methods or strategies
which, if implemented, give us, other things being equal, our
best chances of solving our problems, achieving our aims.
The rules of reason don’t guarantee success, don’t prescribe
in detail what we must do or think, and cannot be
mechanically implemented. They require us, when relevant,
to attend to our feelings, desires, intuition and imagination.
They are meta-rules, in that they presuppose that we can
already put many specific rules into practice in acting
successfully in the world, and tell us how to marshal what
we can already do to give ourselves the best chances of
solving new problems, realizing new aims.
Four basic rules of rational problem-solving are:
(1) Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, the
problem to be solved.
(2) Propose and critically assess possible solutions.
(3) If the problem to be solved is especially difficult,
specialize. That is, break the problem up into subordinate
problems, and formulate preliminary, easier-to-solve
versions of the problem, in an attempt to work gradually to
the solution to the basic problem to be solved.
(4) If (3) is implemented, ensure that basic and specialized
problem-solving interact with one another, so that each
influences the other.
There are now two crucial preliminary points that I must
make.
(a) Granted we seek to realise what is of value in life, the
problems we need to solve are, fundamentally, problems of
living, of action, not problems of knowledge. It is what we
do, or refrain from doing, and not what we know, that
enables us to realise what is of value (except when what we10
seek of value is knowledge and understanding themselves).
Even when new knowledge is needed, in medicine say, or
agriculture, it is always what this knowledge enables us to do
that enables us to realise what is of value, not the knowledge
or technological know-how as such.
(b) Furthermore, in order to realise what is of value in life
more successfully than we do at present, we need to discover
how to tackle our problems of living in more cooperative
ways than we do at present.
It follows from (1) to (4) and (a) and (b) that, if academic
inquiry is to help promote human welfare rationally, then it
needs to give absolute intellectual priority to the tasks of (1)
articulating, and improving the articulation of, our problems
of living, individual, social and global, and (2) proposing and
critically assessing possible (increasingly cooperative)
solutions – possible actions, policies, political programmes,
philosophies of life. This would be the task of social inquiry
and the humanities. Social inquiry would be intellectually
more fundamental than natural science, but would not itself
be science, or concerned, in the first instance, to acquire
knowledge. Academia would also need to tackle a vast array
of specialized problems of knowledge and technological
know-how, in accordance with rule (3), but would at the
same time have to interconnect fundamental and specialized
problem-solving, in accordance with rule (4).
Knowledge-inquiry puts rule (3) splendidly into effect in
tackling a maze specialized problems, of all kinds.
Disastrously, it violates rules (1), (2) and (4). What most
needs to be done, from the standpoint of helping to promote
human welfare, namely (1) articulate problems of living and
(2) propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible
actions, is excluded from knowledge-inquiry altogether. The
failure to implement rules (1) and (2) means rule (4) cannot
be implemented either.11
In short, knowledge-inquiry violates three of the four
most elementary rules of rational problem solving that one
can think of.
It is this massive structural irrationality of knowledge-
inquiry which sabotages its capacity to help humanity learn
how to create a better world. What inquiry most needs to do,
namely (1) articulate problems of living and (2) propose and
critically assess possible solutions, cannot be done at all, if
the edicts of knowledge-inquiry are observed. In addition,
this means the pursuit of knowledge is dissociated from such
discussion, so that scientific research fails to respond
adequately to human need and values. It is worth noting that
something like 30% of research and development funds in
the UK is devoted to the military – 50 % in the USA
(Langley, 2005; Smith, 2003).
Wisdom-inquiry, first version, is what emerges when
knowledge-inquiry is modified just sufficiently to ensure that
the four rules of reason are put into academic practice in a
wholesale, structural fashion. The primary change that needs
to be made is to ensure that academic inquiry implements
rules (1) and (2). It becomes the fundamental task of social
inquiry and the humanities (1) to articulate, and seek to
improve the articulation of, our problems of living, and (2) to
propose and critically assess possible solutions, from the
standpoint of their practicality and desirability. In particular,
social inquiry has the task of discovering how conflicts may
be resolved in less violent, more cooperatively rational ways.
It also has the task of promoting such tackling of problems of
living in the social world beyond academe. Social inquiry is,
thus, not primarily social science nor, primarily, concerned
to acquire knowledge of the social world; its primary task
is to promote more cooperatively rational tackling of
problems of living in the social world. Pursued in this way,
social inquiry is intellectually more fundamental than the
natural and technological sciences, which tackle subordinate12
Diagram 1:
Wisdom-Inquiry Implementing Problem-Solving Rationality
problems of knowledge, understanding and technology, in
accordance with rule (3). In diagram 1, implementation of
rule (3) is represented by the specialized problem solving of
the natural, technological and formal sciences, and more
specialized aspects of social inquiry and the humanities.
Rule (4) is represented by the two-way arrows linking13
fundamental and specialized problem solving, each
influencing the other.
One can go further. According to this view, the thinking
that we engage in as we live, in seeking to realise what is of
value to us, is intellectually more fundamental than the
whole of academic inquiry (which has, as its basic purpose,
to help cooperatively rational thinking and problem solving
in life to flourish). Academic thought emerges as a kind of
specialization of personal and social thinking in life, the
result of implementing rule (3); this means there needs to be
a two-way interplay of ideas, arguments and experiences
between the social world and academia, in accordance with
rule (4). This is represented, in diagram 1, by the two-way
arrows linking academic inquiry and the social world.
The natural and technological sciences need to recognize
three domains of discussion: evidence, theory, and aims.
Discussion of aims seeks to identify that highly problematic
region of overlap between that which is discoverable, and
that which it is of value to discover. Discussion of what it is
of value to discover interacts with social inquiry, in
accordance with rule (4): see diagram 1.
Wisdom-inquiry as depicted in diagram 1, the outcome of
putting rules (1) to (4) into practice, differs profoundly from
academia as it exists at present, the product of knowledge-
inquiry plus some policy studies and anti-rationalist trends
on the fringes of academic work. (For further details see
Maxwell, 1976; 1984 or, better, 2007a.)
From Knowledge-Inquiry to Wisdom-Inquiry:
Second Argument
Why has this profound and damaging structural
irrationality of academic inquiry not been noticed? When
and how did it come about?14
It all goes back to the Enlightenment of the 18
th century –
especially the French Enlightenment. The philosophes had
the wonderful idea that it might be possible to learn from
scientific progress how to make social progress towards an
enlightened world.
This is a profoundly important idea. The philosophes of
the Enlightenment – Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet and others
– did what they could to put this profoundly important idea
into practice in their lives. They fought dictatorial power,
dogma and superstition with weapons no more lethal than
argument and wit (Gay, 1973).
But in developing the idea intellectually, the philosophes
blundered. They botched the job. They thought that what
needed to be done was to develop the social sciences
alongside the natural sciences. Three steps need to be got
right to put the basic Enlightenment idea properly into
practice. The 18
th century Enlightenment got all three steps
wrong!
This traditional, bungled version of the Enlightenment
was then developed throughout the 19
th century by Saint-
Simon, Comte, Marx, Mill and others, and institutionalised
in universities all over the world in the first part of the 20
th
century with the creation of departments of social science:
economics, anthropology, sociology, psychology, political
science.
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The outcome is knowledge-inquiry – by and large what
we have at present: seriously defective and irrational from
the standpoint of helping us create a better world.
But what, it may be asked, is wrong with the traditional
Enlightenment programme?15
In order to implement the Enlightenment programme
properly of learning from scientific progress how to achieve
social progress towards an enlightened world, the three
crucial steps that need to be got right are:
(i) The progress-achieving methods of science need to be
correctly identified.
(ii) These methods need to be correctly generalized so that
they become fruitfully applicable to any human endeavour,
whatever the aims may be, and not just applicable to the
endeavour of improving knowledge.
(iii) The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods
then need to be exploited correctly in the great human
endeavour of trying to make social progress towards an
enlightened, wise, civilized world.
Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got
all three points wrong. And as a result these blunders,
undetected and uncorrected, are built into the intellectual-
institutional structure of academia as it exists today.
First, the philosophes failed to capture correctly the
progress-achieving methods of natural science. From
D’Alembert in the 18
th century to Popper in the 20
th (Popper,
1963), the widely held view, amongst both scientists and
philosophers, has been (and continues to be) that science
proceeds by assessing theories impartially in the light of
evidence, no permanent assumption being accepted by
science about the universe independently of evidence.
But this standard empiricist view is untenable. If taken
literally, it would instantly bring science to a standstill. For,
given any accepted Theory of physics (T), Newtonian
theory say, or quantum theory, endlessly many empirically
more successful rivals can be concocted which agree with T
about observed phenomena but disagree arbitrarily about16
some unobserved phenomena. Physics would be drowned in
an ocean of such empirically more successful rival theories.
In practice, these rivals are excluded because they are
disastrously disunified. Two considerations govern
acceptance of theories in physics: empirical success and
unity. But in persistently accepting unified theories, to the
extent of rejecting disunified rivals that are just as, or even
more, empirically successful, physics makes a big persistent
assumption about the universe. The universe is such that all
disunified theories are false. It has some kind of unified
dynamic structure. It is physically comprehensible in the
sense that explanations for phenomena exist to be
discovered.
But this untestable (and thus metaphysical) assumption
that the universe is comprehensible is profoundly
problematic. Science is obliged to assume, but does not
know, that the universe is comprehensible. Much less does it
know that the universe is comprehensible in this or that way.
A glance at the history of physics reveals that ideas have
changed dramatically over time. In the 17
th century there
was the idea that the universe consists of corpuscles, minute
billiard balls, which interact only by contact. This gave way
to the idea that the universe consists of point-particles
surrounded by rigid, spherically symmetrical fields of force,
which in turn gave way to the idea that there is one unified
self-interacting field, varying smoothly throughout space and
time. Nowadays we have the idea that everything is made up
of minute quantum strings embedded in ten or eleven
dimensions of space-time. Some kind of assumption along
these lines must be made but, given the historical record, and
given that any such assumption concerns the ultimate nature
of the universe, that of which we are most ignorant, it is only
reasonable to conclude that it is almost bound to be false.17
The way to overcome this fundamental dilemma inherent
in the scientific enterprise is to construe physics as making a
hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the
comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these
assumptions asserting less and less as one goes up the
hierarchy, and thus becoming more and more likely to be
true: see diagram 2. In this way a framework of relatively
insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and
associated methods is created within which much more
substantial and problematic assumptions and associated
methods can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific
knowledge improves. Put another way, a framework of
relatively unspecific, unproblematic, fixed aims and methods
is created within which much more specific and problematic
aims and methods evolve as scientific knowledge evolves.
(A basic aim of science is to discover in what precise way
the universe is comprehensible, this aim evolving as
assumptions about comprehensibility evolve.) There is
positive feedback between improving knowledge, and
improving aims-and-methods, improving knowledge-about-
how-to-improve-knowledge. This is the nub of scientific
rationality, the methodological key to the unprecedented
success of science. Science adapts its nature to what it
discovers about the nature of the universe. (For further
details of this argument see Maxwell, 1976, 1984, 1998,
2004, 2007a, especially chapter 14.)
So much for the first blunder of the traditional
Enlightenment, and how to put it right.
Second, having failed to identify the methods of science
correctly, the philosophes naturally failed to generalize these
methods properly. They failed to appreciate that the idea of
representing the problematic aims (and associated methods)
of science in the form of a hierarchy can be generalized and
applied fruitfully to other worthwhile enterprises besides
science. Many other enterprises have problematic aims –18
Diagram 2:
Hierarchical Conception of Science
problematic because aims conflict, and because what we
seek may be unrealisable, undesirable, or both. Such
enterprises, with problematic aims, would benefit from
employing a hierarchical methodology, generalized from that
of science, thus making it possible to improve aims and
methods as the enterprise proceeds. There is the hope that,
as a result of exploiting in life methods generalized from
those employed with such success in science, some of the
astonishing success of science might be exported into other19
worthwhile human endeavours, with problematic aims quite
different from those of science.
Third, and most disastrously of all, the philosophes failed
completely to try to apply such generalized, hierarchical
progress-achieving methods to the immense, and profoundly
problematic enterprise of making social progress towards an
enlightened, wise world. The aim of such an enterprise is
notoriously problematic. For all sorts of reasons, what
constitutes a good world, an enlightened, wise or civilized
world, attainable and genuinely desirable, must be inherently
and permanently problematic.
8 Here, above all, it is essential
to employ the generalized version of the hierarchical,
progress-achieving methods of science, designed specifically
to facilitate progress when basic aims are problematic: see
diagram 3. It is just this that the philosophes failed to do.
Instead of applying the hierarchical methodology to social
life, the philosophes sought to apply a seriously defective
conception of scientific method to social science, to the task
of making progress towards, not a better world, but to better
knowledge of social phenomena. And this ancient blunder is
still built into the institutional and intellectual structure of
academia today, inherent in the current character of social
science (Maxwell, 1984 or 2007a, chapters 3, 6 and 7).
Properly implemented, in short, the Enlightenment idea of
learning from scientific progress how to achieve social
progress towards an enlightened world would involve
developing social inquiry, not as social science, but as social
methodology, or social philosophy. A basic task would be to
get into personal and social life, and into other institutions
besides that of science – into government, industry,
agriculture, commerce, the media, law, education,
international relations – hierarchical, progress-achieving
methods (designed to improve problematic aims) arrived
at by generalizing the methods of science. A basic task
for academic inquiry as a whole would be to help humanity20
Diagram 3:
Hierarchical Social Methodology Generalized from Science
learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in
more just, cooperatively rational ways than at present. This
task would be intellectually more fundamental than the
scientific task of acquiring knowledge. Social inquiry would
be intellectually more fundamental than physics. Academia
would be a kind of people’s civil service, doing openly for
the public what actual civil services are supposed to do in
secret for governments. Academia would have just sufficient21
power (but no more) to retain its independence from
government, industry, the press, public opinion, and other
centres of power and influence in the social world. It would
seek to learn from, educate, and argue with the great social
world beyond, but would not dictate. Academic thought
would be pursued as a specialized, subordinate part of what
is really important and fundamental: the thinking that goes
on, individually, socially and institutionally, in the social
world, guiding individual, social and institutional actions and
life. The fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim of
inquiry would be to help humanity acquire wisdom –
wisdom being the capacity to realise (apprehend and create)
what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus
including knowledge and technological know-how but much
else besides (Maxwell, 1984, p. 86; 2007a, p. 79).
One outcome of getting into social and institutional life
the kind of aim-evolving, hierarchical methodology indicated
above, generalized from science, is that it becomes possible
for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a
part of social life, somewhat as theories are developed and
assessed within science. Such a hierarchical methodology
provides a framework within which competing views about
what our aims and methods in life should be – competing
religious, political and moral views – may be cooperatively
assessed and tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims
(high up in the hierarchy of aims) and the experience of
personal and social life. There is the possibility of
cooperatively and progressively improving such philosophies
of life (views about what is of value in life and how it is to be
achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and progressively
improved in science. In science, ideally, theories are critically
assessed with respect to each other, with respect to metaphysical
ideas concerning the comprehensibilityof the universe, and with
respect to experience (observational and experimental results).
In a somewhat analogous way, diverse philosophies of life
may be critically assessed with respect to each other, with22
respect to relatively uncontroversial, agreed ideas about aims
and what is of value, and with respect to experience – what we
do, achieve, fail to achieve, enjoy and suffer–the aim being to
improve philosophies of life (and more specific philosophies of
more specific enterprises within life such as government,
education or art) so that they offer greater help with the
realization of what is of value in life. This hierarchical
methodology is especially relevant to the task of resolving
conflicts about aims and ideals, as it helps disentangle
agreement (high up in the hierarchy) and disagreement (more
likely to be low down in the hierarchy).
Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour, has
intellectual standards that are, in important respects, different
from those of knowledge-inquiry. Whereas knowledge-
inquiry demands that emotions and desires, values, human
ideals and aspirations, philosophies of life be excluded from
the intellectual domain of inquiry, wisdom-inquiry requires
that they be included. In order to discover what is of value
in life it is essential that we attend to our feelings and
desires. But not everything we desire is desirable, and not
everything that feels good is good. Feelings, desires and
values need to be subjected to critical scrutiny. And of
course feelings, desires and values must not be permitted to
influence judgements of factual truth and falsity. Wisdom-
inquiry embodies a synthesis of traditional rationalism and
romanticism. It includes elements from both, and it
improves on both. It incorporates romantic ideals of
integrity, having to do with motivational and emotional
honesty, honesty about desires and aims; and at the same
time it incorporates traditional rationalist ideals of integrity,
having to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and
valid argument. Traditional rationalism takes its inspiration
from science and method; romanticism takes its inspiration
from art, from imagination, and from passion. Wisdom-
inquiry holds art to have a fundamental rational role in
inquiry, in revealing what is of value, and in unmasking false23
values; but science, too, is of fundamental importance. What
we need, for wisdom, is an interplay of sceptical rationality
and emotion, an interplay of mind and heart, so that we may
develop mindful hearts and heartfelt minds (Maxwell, 1976,
p. 5). It is time we healed the great rift in our culture, so
graphically depicted by Snow (1986).
All in all, if the Enlightenment revolution had been
carried through properly, the three steps indicated above
being correctly implemented, the outcome would have been
a kind of academic inquiry very different from what we have
at present, inquiry devoted primarily to the intellectual aim
of acquiring knowledge.
Conclusion
Humanity is in deep trouble. We urgently need to learn
how to make progress towards a wiser, more civilized world.
This in turn requires that we possess traditions and
institutions of learning rationally designed – well designed –
to help us achieve this end. It is just this that we do not have
at present. What we have instead is natural science and,
more broadly, inquiry devoted to acquiring knowledge.
Judged from the standpoint of helping us create a better
world, knowledge-inquiry of this type is dangerously and
damagingly irrational. We need to bring about a major
intellectual and institutional revolution in the aims and
methods of inquiry, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-
inquiry. Almost every branch and aspect of academic
inquiry needs to change.
A basic intellectual task of academic inquiry would be to
articulate our problems of living (personal, social and global)
and propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible
actions. This would be the task of social inquiry and the
humanities. Tackling problems of knowledge would be
secondary. Social inquiry would be at the heart of the
academic enterprise, intellectually more fundamental than24
natural science. On a rather more long-term basis, social
inquiry would be concerned to help humanity build
hierarchical methods of problem-solving into the fabric of
social and political life so that we may gradually acquire the
capacity to resolve our conflicts and problems of living in
more cooperatively rational ways than at present. Natural
science would change to include three domains of
discussion: evidence, theory, and aims – the latter including
discussion of metaphysics, values and politics. Academia
would actively seek to educate the public by means of
discussion and debate, and would not just study the public.
This revolution – intellectual, institutional and cultural –
if it ever comes about, would be comparable in its long-term
impact to that of the Renaissance, the scientific revolution, or
the Enlightenment. The outcome would be traditions and
institutions of learning rationally designed to help us acquire
wisdom. There are a few scattered signs that this intellectual
revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already under way
provoked in the main by growing awareness of the menace
that global warming represents.
9 It will need, however,
much wider cooperative support – from scientists, scholars,
students, research councils, university administrators, vice
chancellors, teachers, the media and the general public – if it
is to become anything more than what it is at present, a
fragmentary and often impotent movement of protest and
opposition, often at odds with itself, exercising little
influence on the main body of academic work. I can hardly
imagine any more important work for anyone associated
with academia than, in teaching, learning and research, to
help promote this revolution.25
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Endnotes
1. See Maxwell (2007b).
2. For an excellent history of the discovery of global
warming see Weart (2003).
3. For a detailed presentation of the case that knowledge-
inquiry is dominant in academic practice, see Maxwell
(2007a, ch. 6).
4. For a more detailed exposition of standard empiricism and
knowledge-inquiry see Maxwell (1984, ch. 2) or (2007a,
ch. 2).
5. See note 3.
6. For devastating criticisms of postmodernism, relativism
and social constructivism see Sokal (2008).
7. For an excellent brief account of the origins of social
science along these lines, see Farganis (2003). See also
Hayek (1979).
8. There are a number of ways of highlighting the inherently
problematic character of the aim of creating civilization.
People have very different ideas as to what does constitute
civilization. Most views about what constitutes Utopia, an
ideally civilized society, have been unrealizable and
profoundly undesirable. People's interests, values and ideals
clash. Even values that, one may hold, ought to be a part of
civilization may clash. Thus freedom and equality, even
though inter-related, may nevertheless clash. It would be an
odd notion of individual freedom which held that freedom
was for some, and not for others; and yet if equality is
pursued too singlemindedly this will undermine individual
freedom, and will even undermine equality, in that a
privileged class will be required to enforce equality on the
rest, as in the old Soviet Union. A basic aim of legislation
for civilization, we may well hold, ought to be to increase
freedom by restricting it: this brings out the inherently
problematic, paradoxical character of the aim of achieving
civilization. One thinker who has stressed the inherently
problematic, contradictory character of the idea of28
civilization is Isaiah Berlin; see, for example, Berlin (1980,
pp. 74-79). Berlin thought the problem could not be solved;
I, on the contrary, hold that the hierarchical methodology
indicated here provides us with the means to learn how to
improve our solution to it in real life.
9. See chapter 12 of the second edition of Maxwell (1984),
and Maxwell (2009).